Monthly Archives: October 2015
Medical Malpractice: When Common Sense Trumps Expert Knowledge
Medical malpractice cases are difficult and expensive to litigate. However, sometimes experts are not required… Just common sense.
Indiana has long embraced the “common knowledge exception” to requirements of expert testimony in certain matters. A physician’s allegedly negligent act or omission can be so obvious that expert testimony is unnecessary. Wright v. Carter, 622 N.E.2d 170, 171 (Ind. 1993).
In Indiana, cases where expert opinion evidence is not necessary typically involve the failure of the operating physician to remove some foreign object from the patient’s body. Funk v. Bonham (1932), 204 Ind. 170, 183 N.E. 312 (sponge left in abdomen), Ciesiolka v. Selby (1970), 147 Ind. App. 396, 261 N.E.2d 95 (teflon mesh left in abdomen); Klinger v. Caylor (1971),148 Ind. App. 508, 267 N.E.2d 848 (“surgical padding” left in intestinal tract); and Burke v. Capello (1988), Ind.,520 N.E.2d 439 (cement left in hip). Likewise, in a similar fashion, res ipsa loquitur applied when a patient’s oxygen mask caught fire during surgery, see Cleary v.Manning, 884 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
This same sort of common sense approach is endorsed in other jurisdictions as well.Bernsden v. Johnson, 174 Kan. 230, 236-37, 255 P.2d 1033 (1953)(applying exception when post-surgery choking was caused by metal disc lodged in patient’s throat); Biggs v. Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc., 69 N.C.App. 547, 317 S.E.2d 421 (1984) (where patient is known to be in weakened condition and is left alone in shower, where she falls, expert testimony on standards for nurse’s aides not required); Burks v. Christ Hosp., 19 Ohio St.2d 128, 131, 249 N.E.2d 829 (1969) (sedated, obese patient fell from hospital bed without side rails); Cockerton v. Mercy Hospital Medical Center, 490 N.W.2d 856 (Iowa App.1992)(where patient fell while in x-ray room expert testimony was not required on hospital’s negligence); Dimora v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 114 Ohio App.3d 711, 718, 683 N.E.2d 1175 (8th Dist.1996) (patient fell after student nurse left her unattended at her walker while opening a door); German v. Nichopoulos, 577 S.W.2d 197, 202-03 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) overruled on other grounds by Seavers, 9 S.W.3d at 96; Green v. Lilliewood, 272 S.C. 186, 249 S.E.2d 910 (1978) (holding tubal ligation rendering intrauterine device and other birth control device useless constitutes a matter of common knowledge); Hickman v. Sexton Dental Clinic, P.A., 295 S.C. 164, 367 S.E.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to infer without the aid of expert testimony a breach of duty to dental patient where patient testified an unsupervised dental assistant rammed a sharp object into patient’s mouth); Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 395, 774 A.2d 495, 500 (2001) (case in which the defendant dentist allegedly pulled the wrong tooth); LaCourse v. Flower Hosp., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L–02–1004, 2002-Ohio-3816, 2002 WL 1729897, ¶ 16;) McConkey v. State, 128 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Murphy v. Schwartz, 739 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986); Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575 (3d Cir.2003) (personnel failed to call treating physician to determine how often insulin was to be administered); Newhall v. Central Vermont Hospital, Inc., 133 Vt. 572, 349 A.2d 890 (1975)(expert testimony not required where nurse failed to respond to sedated patient’s call and patient got out of bed and fell); Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398, 400, 774 A.2d 501 (2001)(misread the specimen identification numbers as plaintiff’s test result numbers and mistakenly determined that plaintiff had an ectopic pregnancy) Robbins v. Jewish Hospital of St. Louis, 663 S.W.2d 341 (Mo.App.1983) (expert testimony not required where bed rails not raised and brain damaged patient fell out); Rule v. Cheeseman, Executrix, 181 Kan. 957, 963, 317 P.2d 472 (1957) (all four cases applying exception when sponge was left in patient after surgery); Schraffenberger v. Persinger, Malik & Haaf, M.D.’s, Inc., 114 Ohio App.3d 263, 267, 683 N.E.2d 60 (1st Dist.1996) (patient alleged that doctor negligently and erroneously informed him that he was sterile following a vasectomy); Schwartz v. Abay, 26 Kan.App.2d 707, 995 P.2d 878 (1999) (applying exception where surgeon removed 60% of the wrong vertebral disc); Seavers v. Methodist Med. Ctr. of Oak Ridge, 9 S.W.3d 86, 92 (Tenn. 1999); Thomas v. Dootson, 377 S.C. 293, 659 S.E.2d 253 (Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing expert testimony was not required for claim arising from a surgical drill that burned skin on contact because claim would fall within the common knowledge or experience of laymen); Veesart v. Community Hospital Asso., 211 Kan. 896, 508 P.2d 506 (1973) (expert evidence not required where elderly patient fell while going to bathroom); Walker v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center, 545 So.2d 769 (Ala.1989)(where bed rail left down contrary to doctor’s order and patient fell, no expert testimony required on standard of care); Washington Hospital Center v. Martin, 454 A.2d 306 (D.C.App.1982)(mere fact that patient falls in hospital will not normally require expert testimony on hospital’s negligence).
Medical malpractice litigation is expensive enough for a citizen to pursue. Common sense propositions should not require expert testimony. The underlying purpose of Indiana’s Rules of Evidence is set forth in Rule 102:
Purpose and Construction
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
The implementation of the “common knowledge exception” “eliminates unjustifiable expense” so that the “truth may be ascertained” and “proceedings justly determined.” Trial Rule 1 of Indiana’s Rules of Trial Procedure echoes similar sentiments noting:
They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.
The costs of medical malpractice cases are such that only a handful of cases are economically feasible to pursue, thereby closing the court house doors to most claims. Gary T. Schwartz, Medical Malpractice, Tort, Contract, and Managed Care, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 885, 895 (discussing how non-“large-damage” medical malpractice claims are impractical); Jeffrey J. Parker, Comment, Contingent Expert Witness Fees: Access and Legitimacy, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1363, 1369 (1991) (“[F]ees to employ necessary expert witnesses constitute substantial litigation expenses.”).
So remember that the “common knowledge exception” can be uncommonly economical and effective.
The Case Against Experts in the Courtroom
“If you can’t explain it to a six year old, you don’t understand it yourself.” Albert Einstein
I have always thought it is unclear whether Indiana Rule of Evidence (IRE) 615 applies to depositions. IRE 101(C) states:
Rules Inapplicable. The rules, other than those with respect to privileges, do not apply in the following situations:
(1) Preliminary questions of fact. The determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court under Rule 104(a).
(2) Miscellaneous proceedings. Proceedings relating to extradition, sentencing, probation, or parole; issuance of criminal summonses, or of warrants for arrest or search, preliminary juvenile matters, direct contempt, bail hearings, small claims, and grand jury proceedings.
Interestingly enough, no mention of depositions is made in the proceedings excluded.
Ind.T.R. 30(C) states in part:
Examination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as permitted at the trial under the provisions of Rule 43(B). *** All objections made at the time of the examination to the qualifications of the officer taking the deposition, or to the manner of taking it, or to the evidence presented, or to the conduct of any party, and any other objection to the proceedings, shall be noted by the officer upon the deposition. When there is an objection to a question, the objection and reason therefr shall be noted, and the question shall be answered unless the attorney instructs the deponent not to answer, or the deponent refuses to answer, in which case either party may have the question certified by the Reporter, and the question with the objection thereto when so certified shall be delivered to the party requesting the certification who may then proceed under Rule 37(A).
Ind. T.R. 32(B) states:
Objections to admissibility. Subject to the provisions of Rule 28(B) and subdivision (D)(3) of this rule, objection may be made at the trial or hearing to receiving in evidence any depositions or part thereof for any reason which would require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then present and testifying.
* * *
(D) Effect of errors and irregularities in depositions
(3) As to taking of deposition.
(a) Objections to the competency of a witness or to the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to make them before or during the taking of the deposition, unless the ground of the objection is one which might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time.
(b) Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the manner of taking the deposition, in the form of the questions or answers, in the oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of parties and errors of any kind which might be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly presented, are waived unless reasonable objection thereto is made at the taking of the deposition. ***
Ind. T.R. 43(B) then reads:
Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.
My take away from all of this is that if you want to use the deposition at trial or in connection with a motion for summary judgment, then the rules of evidence would apply. Also, if you do not object to the presence of the expert at the time of the deposition pursuant to IRE 615 the objection is waived because it could have been obviated by the opposing attorney by ordering the expert to leave. If the opposing attorney disagrees then you would have to hope you win the issue at trial or stop the deposition and immediately file a motion to terminate under Ind. T.R. 30(D). As a result, I would think a court would find IRE 615 applicable to a deposition.
That being said, I think having an expert present to aid you in examining another expert would usually be “a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party’s cause” under IRE 615(C). In Ledden v Kuzma, 858 N.E.2d 186 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), the Kuzmas sought a protective order barring Ledden’s expert from attending Ledden’s deposition of the Kuzmas’ expert witness. The Court of Appeals stated:
Under appropriate circumstances, it may be proper for a protective order to be granted barring an expert -or anyone else – from attending the deposition in question. If a party is able to meet the requirements of Trial Rule 26(c)(5), then a protective order would be warranted. But if, as here, a party is unable to provide any particular and specific demonstration of fact in support of the request for a protective order, then there is no reason – based in logic or rule – to bar the expert from attending the deposition.
Generic allegations of prejudice were made in Ledden v Kuzma. A factual demonstration supported by evidence of real harm seems to be required given the holding in Ledden v Kuzma.
Trial is a different thing. The argument for the a separation of witnesses is weaker at the discovery stage since you may need the help of your own expert to pin someone down at the pretrial discovery stage whether investigation is needed. While IRE 615(C) does allow a party to designate a person whose presence is essential to their presentation to be present in the courtroom, this creates practical problems and raises concerns about “fairness in administration” and “the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.” See IRE 102 Purpose and Construction.
When I had this occur in a trial, I successfully argued that the defense expert is not allow to watch the trial and weigh evidence as this is the sole province of the jury. IRE 702(A) states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Allowing expert to attend the trial and opine is a kin to having a shadow jury. Such a process misleads the jury as to an expert’s true role which is to aid the jury in deciding the case, not supplant them. Trial testimony by the expert could run afoul of Rule 704(B) since the expert would in essence be testifying as to whether a witness (including your expert) testified truthfully by opining after watching all the witnesses testify. Also, Ind.T.R. 26 requires that the basis and opinion of an expert be seasonably disclosed before the trial. An expert’s opinion would change and morph as the trial progressed. The expert, not the jury, would resolve questions of fact, credibility and the weight to be given witness testimony and items of evidence. Such expert testimony could impair or deprive a party of their constitutional right to trial by jury.
So, what do you think?
When a Negative Becomes a Positive
Absence makes the.heart grow fonder and can also act as proof positive in a case of “missing” evidence or documents. First, there are two noted exceptions to the hearsay rule for the absence of a record. Indiana Rule of Evidence 803 has two subdivisions that deal with the admissibility:
803. Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarant Immaterial
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness.
* * * * *
(6) Records of Regularly Conducted Business Activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony or affidavit of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. The term “business” as used in this Rule includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(7) Absence of Entry in Records Kept in Accordance With the Provisions of Paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public Records and Reports. Unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness, records, reports, statements, or data compilations in any form, of a public office or agency, setting forth its regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities, or matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law and as to which there was a duty to report, or factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law. The following are not within this exception to the hearsay rule: (a) investigative reports by police and other law enforcement personnel, except when offered by an accused in a criminal case; (b) investigative reports prepared by or for a government, a public office, or an agency when offered by it in a case in which it is a party; (c) factual findings offered by the government in criminal cases; and (d) factual findings resulting from special investigation of a particular complaint, case, or incident, except when offered by an accused in a criminal case.
(9) Records of Vital Statistics. Records or data compilations in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law.
(10) Absence of Public Record or Entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or data compilation in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation in any form was regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that a diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.
* * * * *
The reason behind the exception for business records and their absence is the fact that they are regularly maintained records upon which the company relies in conducting its business which assures their trustworthiness. The rules of evidence governing the admission of business records are of common law origin and have evolved on a case-by-case basis to keep pace with the technology of current business methods of record keeping. This logic supports the existence of an exception for public records ( and their absence) for governmental organizations who must rely on the trustworthiness of their records to carry out their duties.
Likewise, the absence of a witness can make their prior testimony, statement against interests or dying declaration admissible. See Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable.
Finally, if evidence goes missing, then its absence may give rise to a positive inference that the evidence would have been unfavorable had it been found and not gone missing. In Miller v. Federal Exp. Corp., 6 N.E.3d 1006 (Ind.App.,2014) The Indiana Supreme Court recognized that:
[I]ntentional destruction of potential evidence in order to disrupt or defeat another persons’s right of recovery is highly improper and cannot be justified. The intentional or negligent destruction or spoliation of evidence cannot be condoned and threatens the very integrity of our judicial system. There can be no truth, fairness, or justice in a civil action where relevant evidence has been destroyed before trial. Destroying evidence can destroy fairness and justice, for it increases the risk of an erroneous decision on the merits of the underlying cause of action. Destroying evidence can also increase the costs of litigation as parties attempt to reconstruct the destroyed evidence or to develop other evidence, which may be less accessible, less persuasive, or both.
The spoliation rule also has applies in the cases of an absent witness. If a party has exclusive power to produce a material witness and fails to do so, it may give rise to an inference that the witness would testify unfavorably to the party who had the exclusive control. Breese v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Bowes v. Lambert, 114 Ind. App. 364, 51 N.E.2d 83 (1943); Public Sav. Ins. Co. v. Greenwald, 68 Ind. App. 609, 118 N.E. 556 (1918); Godwin v. De Motte, 64 Ind. App. 394, 116 N.E. 17 (1917).
The spoliation rule also is enforced in federal court, however, exclusive control and a lack of availability to the complaining party must be shown. Oxman v. WLS-TV, 12 F.3d 652, 661 (7th Cir. 1993); Chicago Coll. of Osteopathic Med. v. George A. Fuller Co., 719 F.2d 1335, 1353 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1053 (7th Cir. 1974) (where missing witness was beyond subpoena power of defendants and there was evidence both that missing witness was available to adverse party and that missing witness’s testimony could have thrown significant light on crucial question in case, it was error to instruct that jury may infer missing witness’s testimony would be merely “of no aid” rather than “adverse” to non-producing party’s case).